History of Sudan
History of Sudan
Pre-Conflict Darfur
1980s
Build-Up
February 2003 - Current Conflict and Genocide
Peace Negotiations
Peace Monitoring Forces
Diplomatic "Soft" Response
United Nations
International Criminal Court
Works Cited
History of Sudan
The ethnic conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan has resulted in an estimated 400,000 deaths, 200,000 refugees in Chad, and 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). The vast majority of these are ethnic-black African Darfurians, many from the three largest ethnic tribes of the Fur, Masaalit, and Zaghawa. The recent cycle of violence, of which the above statistics result from, began in February 2003 when two ethnic-African rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) attacked government outposts. The government of Khartoum (led by the National Congress Party, formerly the National Islamic Front) and its proxy Arab militias (the janjaweed) responded by targeting civilians, in addition to clashing with the rebel groups. The US Congress has labeled the Sudanese government’s counter insurgency strategy “genocide”, while the UN and others have determined Khartoum’s actions to be “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity”. Beyond playing around with terminology, the international community has only meagerly addressed the issue of Darfur. Efforts have been made in three main areas in attempt to manage the conflict, relying heavily on the young African Union: peace negotiations, peace monitoring troops, and diplomatic, symbolic action. As approximately 10,000 civilians continue to die each month due to violence, malnutrition, and disease, the measures taken by the international community – the most capable, experienced, and arguably responsible actors in stopping the conflict – have been too little, too late.
Pre-Conflict Darfur
Before the war broke out in 2003, Darfur's population was estimated to have been between 6-7 million people, 60-65% of whom were from ethnic-African tribes and 35-40% of whom were from various ethnic-Arab tribes (Reeves, July 2005). In all, there have been between 40 and 80 ethnic groups recorded on in Darfur (De Waal 8). Darfurian villages, however, were not homogeneous; all villages in Darfur were, and had been for hundreds of years, multi-ethnic to a great degree, with intermarriage common as well (De Waal 4). Darfurians all speak Arabic, with Arabs using it at their mother tongue and ethnic-Africans using it as a lingua franca. All Darfurians speak other languages as well; in a certain region, for example, the inhabitants speak Arabic, Fur, and Masaalit (De Waal 4-5). All Darfurians are also Muslim. Arab and African Darfurians do differ in agricultural techniques and certain customs, in addition to using Arabic as the first language (Reeves, July 2005). To note, the similar differentiations can be said when comparing different African tribes or Arab tribes among themselves. Up until the recent fighting, most Darfurians reportedly referred to themselves primarily “as Sudanese and secondarily as westerners or Darfurians”, and not along the lines of “Arab” or “African” ("Questions & Answers”). Indeed, the mixed settlement patterns and intermarriage resulted in many Darfurians being of mixed tribal heritage.
1980s
In the 1980s, pastoralists and farmers began to clash, which in addition to political mobilization, created the new broad ethnic identities of “Arab” and “African.” Conflict between groups began due to herders migrating south earlier in the season every year. Increased desertification infringed on traditional herding routes, and the lack of arid land caused the herders to lead their animals onto farmers’ land (Questions & Answers”). Violence erupted between Arab pastoralists and African farmers, including two massacres of Arab herders in 1998 and 1999. Also occurring at this time was the mobilization of certain Arabs from the Darfur region to help the Khartoum government wage its war against the Southern People’s Liberation Movement, using the call of jihad. Those involved in the militias are primarily recruited from poor nomadic Arab groups from both Darfur and Chad, many of whose leaders have history in skirmishes with the farming groups ("Questions & Answers”). As certain Arabs were recruited to fight with the Arab government, and the land and water conflicts increased between mostly Arab and African tribes, a new conception of identities evolved. De Waal poses the question, however, did people define themselves along ancestral lines because of security or because when “disputes came to be settled and compensation paid, corporate lineage groups were responsible for paying blood money?” (De Waal 7). As Bates notes, “the ties that bind the members of ethnic groups are often material interest, and not traditional obligations” (Bates 153). Whether for blood money, or the incentives of being recruited as an Arab militia, new identities were formed. What is apparent is that the “communal formation and conflict are not merely the reflection of cultural ‘givens’ and ‘primordial sentiments.’ Social change leads to the formation of entirely new communal groupings which crystallize around new foci of culture and identity” (Melson 1129).
Since the breakout of this conflict in early 2003, Darfur has become increasingly violent, chaotic, complicated, and ethnicized. Shortly after the SLA and JEM began attacks, the janjaweed counteroffensive began. This offensive combined with the major government offensive in early 2004 turned the tables entirely on the rebels. With this also came the genocide, with the Government and the janjaweed massively displacing, killing, torturing, raping, and cutting ethnic-African civilians off from aid. It has been the coordinated attacks by the Government and the janjaweed that have characterized this conflict. It is an imbalanced fight as well, as the Government has resources to its advantage. Sudan began exporting oil in August 1999, which provides an estimated one-half to one billion dollar yearly revenue. “As a result, Sudan has been able to purchase additional attack helicopters, MiGs, and other materials. These new weapons and aircraft have been shifted from the 21-year war in the south to Darfur after October 2002, when a ceasefire in the south was reached” ("Questions & Answers”). The Government also has armed, recruited, and trained approximately 20,000 janjaweed. The janjaweed are “extremely heavily armed, well-supplied, and actively coordinating with the regime’s regular ground and air forced (Reeves, Oct 2005).” In all, the Government force is strong, well-equipped, and well-manned.
The first peace talks took place in Abeche, Chad in September 2003, eight months after the rebel attacks began. The negotiations were between the government and the SLA, and a tentative ceasefire was agreed upon. In November 2005, 26 months after the first round, the SLA, JEM, and government began the seventh round of talks in Abuja, Nigeria. These peace talks are hosted by the African Union, with strong UN, US, Chad, and other international support. This strong international logistical, training, and other support is quite necessary, as this is one of the first peace negotiations the AU has run. Whether such a task should be delegated to such an inexperienced group is one debate that has arisen. The present talks are focused on creating a power-sharing agreement. It also marks the first round where the SLA and JEM have presented a joint position. The rebel demands include a vice presidency spot in the Government, and a return to the borders of 1956, the year Sudan gained independence from the British (“Nigeria-Sudan”). These talks, like the North-South talks, are proceeding very slowly, and from the beginning “promised to be long and frustrating, dogged by incompetence and bad faith on all sides” (De Waal 120).
There are several flaws with these talks, the largest being giving credibility to the sincerity of the actors. First, the representation of the government – of the newly formed Government of National Unity – comes only from the Northern coalition, and not enough southern Sudanese representatives. This is important, in that the rebel groups already have trust in parts of the SPLM, from which it has received political support and encouragement from their success in obtaining concessions within a new government. One major impediment to success is the inability to ensure the sincerity of Khartoum, even to its commitments to the international community to allow humanitarian aide in. Repeatedly the Government has made it difficult for humanitarian convoys to enter in to Sudan. Most recently, it held up the entering of 105 Canadian-loaned armored convoys for months to provide safer transportation for AU troops. As well, there are no janjaweed representatives at these negotiations, which de facto places the Khartoum delegation in charge. However, Khartoum continues to deny any cooperation or connection with the janjaweed.
Another danger in these talks is that it tries to consolidate the rebels’ stance, when in reality they are very split. The danger lies, therefore, in the implementation of the agreement beyond the negotiation table. The recent round of talks was held up by a split in SLA leadership, showing how easily these talks can break down from any party. The two leaders of the SLA came together a week later and are now taking part in the talks. Much pre-talk negotiation was needed to bring the SLA split-leadership to the table together.
Accountability and enforcement are the true indications of successful outcomes of these talks; the inability thus far of international troops to do these makes the success of the present talks questionable as well. While mentioned earlier in regards to Khartoum, this also applies to enforcing the rebels’ compliance with agreements. The April 8, 2004 talks in N’Djamena concluded in agreement to a ceasefire and further negotiations. A lack of a clear timetable and structure for international monitoring though has made it merely ink. Repeatedly, “Khartoum crossed the Security Council’s red line. Nothing happened.” (De Waal 128). Also agreed upon were increased access to humanitarian aide, allowance and cooperation with international monitors and security forces, and a commitment to expediting the political agreement to end the conflict. All of these points were unable to be ensured, and indeed, both Khartoum and the rebels broke the ceasefire almost immediately. Bringing all of the sides together is one task, negotiating agreements is a second task, and enforcing the agreement which creates accountability, trust, and future-capital, is quite another.
Peace Monitoring Forces
According to the African Union Mandate for Darfur, the primary tasks of the peacekeepers are of a monitoring nature. It notes, the AU troops are to “monitor and verify…” how secure it is for IDPs to return home, how secure it is for IDPs in camps, the ceasefire, hostile militia activities against the population, and that the Government is disarming the janjaweed (“Communiqué”). The troops can only “protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS [Government of Sudan]; protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity…; [and] provide visible military presence by patrolling.” With this mandate, the AU and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is very limited in what it can do. In many respects, its tasks accorded are peacekeeping; however, when there is no peace to keep, monitoring becomes secondary to civilian protection.
The African Union peacekeeping mission, with first troops having entered Darfur in 2004 from Rwanda and Nigeria (“Peace and Security”), is also deficient in size. According to multiple human rights monitors, the AU “suffer[s] from "grossly inadequate" numbers of troops and police, a weak mandate, and limited equipment (“The Successes”).” Currently, there are 6,700 troops on the ground in Darfur. This is an increase of over 3,000 troops from April 2004. These 6,700 troops are intended to cover an area the size of France or Texas. The lack of numbers has put additional civilians, IDPs in camps, humanitarian workers, and AU workers themselves at risk of attack and kidnapping.
There exists a consensus from multiple think-tank and human rights reports: the AU troops and its mandate need to be expanded (under Chapter VII civilian protection mandate). The International Crisis Group recommends that “the troop level on the ground in Darfur needs to be brought up to 12,000-15,000 immediately in order to create the requisite security to protect civilians, encourage displaced persons to begin to return home and establish conditions conducive to more productive negotiations for a political settlement” (“The EU/AU Partnership”). This means that at the very least the AU is working at half of what it needs to be right now. Retired Marine Captain, and vocal advocate, Brian Steidle assesses that “with very little western support, [there should be] 25,000 to 50,000 troops on the ground. But I think that if we give them a large amount of support, I think that we can probably bring that down to maybe ten or fifteen thousand to cover the entire area” (“Images of Disaster”). As of now, the AU is “severely deficient in transport and communications equipment” (De Waal 119). Improved equipment and arms technology would greatly change the nature of the conflict, and reduce the need for such large numbers of troops, which the AU could not produce alone.
The AU has been successful in some of its tasks, showing that while young, it has the potential to be able to help the situation. A recent report notes that the AU troops are “able to assist humanitarian agencies with their convoys. They’re able to negotiate for the release of abducted aid workers, and they’re able to be a sort of beacon of security where IDPs can come when there is instability” (“Peace and Security”). Another report notes, “their presence has deterred the rape of women, reduced the recruitment of children into armed forces, protected humanitarian corridors and aid convoys, reduced the looting of animals belonging to Arab nomads, and helped displaced persons who returned to their homes” (“The Successes”). These reports, however, only briefly address the successes of the AU troops, and spend much more time and space making recommendations for improving the mandate, size, equipment, and logistical capacity of the AU. There is no doubt that the AU needs help, financially, logistically, and militarily.
The AU would not be functioning even as it is now without the deployment and sustainability support the EU, EU states, US, Canada, Australia, and UN bodies have given them. It costs approximately $221 million to keep AU forces deployed for one year; the US is a strong backer, providing around $190 million and passed the provision to help aid AU troops in a congressional act. However, $50 million dollars intended for AU troops in the Foreign Relations Bill was cut; efforts to reinstate it could possibly fail. Canada has provided 105 armored personnel carriers, and other countries have given funding in the millions as well. The UN has provided $100 million to the AU mission and the EU has provided another $100 million from their African Peace Facility (“The EU/AU Partnership”). The European Union and the US have offered support to process the ceasefire with personnel, logistics, funding and other support. NATO has offered to help the AU expand its peacekeeping mission through airlifting troops, assisting with training, assisting in running a multinational military headquarters and managing intelligence. The financial, logistical, and other support of these national bodies has been minimal, as the scope of the conflict necessitates exponentially more aid. In many ways, these efforts are merely symbolic.
There are currently UN monitoring troops as well in Sudan, though not primarily in Darfur. These troops are a part of the United Nation’s Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), established in March 2005 to enforce North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. In regards to Darfur specifically, the UN publishes a monthly report on the Khartoum’s disarmament of the janjaweed. The UN troops also assist the AU with planning and assessments for its peacekeeping mission and with the Abuja peace-talks. They also employ human rights monitors, and established a UN assistance office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (the AU’s home) to supply “operational, headquarters and strategic levels” support and coordination. They are currently placing some UN military observers and civilian police officers and staff in field offices in Darfur (“Sudan – UNMIS”). The actual numbers of UNMIS workers in Darfur is not available, though in the entire Sudan it exceeds 3,000.
Diplomatic "Soft" Response
The majority of the international response can be spliced into sound bites intended to be broadcast and published. It has been characterized by diplomatic and symbolic visits, gestures, speeches, and declarations, UN Security Council resolutions, and an ICC investigation. There is no doubt that UN, US, and other officials “have played a key role in raising the awareness of international governments and media to the gravity and scale of the abuses in Darfur (“Darfur Destroyed”)” though their words have not been matched with actions.
International Western actors, especially the United States, have been most active and visible on the diplomatic and symbolic front. The US has taken strongest public stance with repeated statements and condemnations of the situation in Darfur. There have been Congressional hearings and resolutions; currently the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act was passed in the Senate and is waging an uphill battle in the House. There have been repeated visits and statements from State Department representatives, including visits to Khartoum from Condoleezza Rice, and four from the Deputy Secretary of State (“Darfur Destroyed”), These high-profile visits are intended to invoke response from the Khartoum government, though critics say that they have instead served to create normal relations between the two countries. Ironically, in light of all of the meetings and talks, the US has upgraded Sudan’s status on the issue of slavery and human trafficking from tier 4 to tier 3 to tier 2 – on par with Switzerland, while no report in improvement on these fronts have been documented; indeed human trafficking from the South to the North of Sudan is still a wide-spread practice. As well, the US is working with Sudan on the War Against Terror.
Much of the talking among the international community has been on terminology. The US Congress declared the fighting in Darfur a genocide July 22, 2004; Colin Powell did September 9, 2004 (“Powell Reports”). According to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UN 1948), once it is recognized, action must be taken. The US has taken action of sorts, though not obviously in a serious mindset. In addition, other countries, while not calling it genocide, have denounced the government and the humanitarian disaster, ethnic cleansing, and war crime activities.
United Nations
Moving from diplomacy to the UN Security Council, the effects remain the same: strong condemnations resulting in questionable change. The UN refers to the violence in Darfur as ethnic cleansing, and acts of war. There have been a number of Security Council Resolutions on Darfur. In July 2004, Resolution 1556 was passed demanding that the Sudanese government disarm, apprehend, and try the janjaweed. In September 2004, Resolution 1564 was passed due to the failure of 1556. In this Resolution, a military flight ban in and over Darfur was instated, the names of janjaweed militiamen were asked for to be disarmed and arrested, the International Commission of Inquiry into violations of international humanitarian and human rights law was established, and sanctions were threatened if this Resolution was also thrown to the wayside. In March 2005, Resolution 1593 referred Darfur to the ICC Prosecutor with a list of 51 undisclosed names. Resolution 1591, strengthened the arms embargo and asset frieze and travel ban, and war criminals will be tried by the ICC. None of these resolutions have been enforced, however. Any additional UN action (truly Security Council action) is dubious. One reason is that Khartoum “ buys and receives military supplies from several countries, including China, Russia, Belarus and others” ("Questions & Answers”). Khartoum exports oil to China, and buys arms from Russia (De Waal 127). The geopolitics of the situation has and will continue to inhibit harsh actions on behalf of the UN.
International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court, opened in 2003, is now hearing cases of crimes in Darfur. In June 2005 the Prosecutor opened up investigations into three situations, to the protest of Khartoum. The ICC, set up to try individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, is still in deliberations of whom they will be bringing to trial. The court can only refer cases of incidents that have occurred after July 1, 2002 to the ICC, which encompasses the majority of potential cases. One debate with the emphasis on utilizing international law in Darfur is whether it is too soon. Some argue that the ICC case “focuses more on the future punishment of the crime rather than its current prevention” (Reeves, July 2005). Others believe that it will serve as a deterrent to future war criminals. Another problem is that the potential deterrent effect might be lost, as it will take some time before the case is actually brought to court, carried out, and decided upon. And then, the issue of enforcement remains.